US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01474.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 28KB | 553 lines

$Unique_ID{USH01474}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 20C  Parry Island - George Washington's Birthday}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{admiral
rear
february
turner
island
eniwetok
assault
general
parry
support}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 20C  Parry Island - George Washington's Birthday

     The Parry Island assault was originally scheduled for the morning of 20
February.  The reembarking of troops and medium tanks and the exhaustion of
the tank personnel led to a postponement to 0900, 22 February.

     According to Rear Admiral Harry Hill's report, the attack was postponed
to permit rehabilitation and reorganization of personnel and equipment and to
allow additional time for air and surface bombardment of Parry.  Newly found
targets had been made visible by the blasting away of Parry Island foliage
during the air and gun bombardments of the previous day.

     As late as 13 February, CTG 58.4 (Commander Carrier Task Group Four), in
reporting that his planes had bombed Parry Island, added that no defensive
installations were noted on Parry.  This was corrected the next day when
concrete pillboxes and sandtraps were reported.

     Because of the difficulties encountered in taking Eniwetok Island and
because Japanese documents captured on Engebi indicated there were 1,200
troops and strong defensive installations on Parry Island, a great deal more
preliminary gun and air bombardment was considered necessary against Parry
Island than against Eniwetok or Engebi Islands.  Engebi Island had received
some 6,765 shells from 5-inch to 16-inch (1,180 tons) but Eniwetok only about
5,432 shells, with none larger than 8-inch.  Over the next two days 11,740
shells were dropped on Parry's 200 acres, of which 945 tons were naval
bombardment and 245 tons were artillery bombardment.  When this tonnage was
added to the initial gun bombardment along with the air bombardment, Parry
Island was really mauled with much of its heavy foliage stripped away and
damage inflicted on all above ground installations and to some of the network
of underground entrenchments.

     Rear Admiral Hill reported that:  "During this bombardment practically
all remaining ammunition in the attack force was utilized."

     A further major change of plans was made, substituting the 22nd Marine
Regiment for the 106th Infantry Regiment for the assault on Parry, since the
majority of the latter were still busy on Eniwetok.  Two Marine Battalion
Landing Teams would make the assault, with the Third Marine Battalion Landing
Team, initially in the Regimental Reserve, but scheduled to land on order and
participate in the fight to capture the southern part of Parry Island.  One
makeshift Provisional Battalion from the 10th Marine Defense Battalion, just
arrived at Eniwetok Atoll on 21 February as part of the Garrison Force, and
one Battalion Landing Team from the 106th Infantry Regiment, would form the
Task Group Reserve.

     Artillery emplaced on Japan Island to the north and on the eastern end of
Eniwetok Island to the southwest provided artillery support.

     A real assist had resulted when:

On Eniwetok on the 20th was found a map showing the detailed Japanese plans
for the defense of Parry Island, approved 27 January 1944 . . . .

     A very last minute change in Marine landing plans shortened and shifted
the landing beach area.

     The Marines were landed at 0900 but the initial wave was some 300 yards
to the south of the designated landing beaches, marked by the remains of a
pier, although on target for the beaches designated in the original Marine
Landing Plan.  The smoke and dust generated by the heavy bombardment which
drifted westward with the easterly 21-knot wind generally has been ascribed as
the cause of the error, as the landing craft were headed about directly into
the wind.  But a more realistic appraisal would seem to be that the change in
location of the beaches did not reach the lowly Boat Wave Commanders in time,
although Commander Transport Division 30 lists "New Green Two and New Green
Three" in his "Addenda J" to Appendix 4 to Annex How.  The available written
reports indicate an on-the-button landing.  One, for example, states:

All waves were despatched and reached the beach on schedule . . . .  The
formation and movement of the waves was excellent in all respects.

     Additionally, the destroyer Hailey mistakenly fired upon three LCI(G)
supporting the landing approach, resulting in heavy personnel losses to these
newly created gunboats.  Commander LCI(L) Division 15 reported that the smoke
from the shore bombardment, blowing down towards the boat waves reduced the
visibility to 400 yards and produced a navigational problem for the assault.

     But the Marines were landed on schedule, although a bit off base, and the
LCI(G)'s fired their rockets as scheduled.  This ability' to carry through
under real difficulties caused the Task Group Commander to report:

I cannot praise too highly the resolution and devotion to duty displayed by
the officers and men manning these ships.

     The Marines moved steadily forward and, despite some land mines, blasted
out the Japanese spiderweb defensive systems with grenades, flame throwers,
and demolition charges.  One troop-support close-gunfire mission was
requested.  This was refused by the Commander Headquarters Support Aircraft,
Captain Richard F. Whitehead, believing that friendly troops were too close to
the target designated.  When the upper echelons of command were bypassed with
a second request on another radio circuit, and the gunfire provided, Marine
casualties occurred.  By nightfall all but 450 yards at the southern end of
Parry had been overrun.

     Large-scale star shell illumination was maintained over Parry Island
throughout the night of 22-23 February, the first such extended continued
large-scale use in the Pacific amphibious campaigns.

     Mopping up operations on Parry were completed on 23 February, Dog plus
six, and the Eniwetok Operation was officially over.  By 27 February 1944,
Navy planes were operating from Engebi Airstrip.

The Battle Is Over

     COMCENPAC sent his victory message on 23 February, and said:

The speed with which the operation was planned and carried out reflected great
credit on all the amphibians.

Gun Support

     It has been pointed out that Engebi and Parry Island received the larger
share of air bombing and gun bombardment.  These two islands were secured in
one day each but, in between, Eniwetok took three days of hard fighting.  Part
of the reason can be found in the inadequate use of close gun and close air
support.  There were only 28 requests for troop support missions.  Of these,
24 were fulfilled.  Rear Admiral Hill reported that "in spite of the ideal
opportunity offered on Eniwetok Island, little use was made of call fire from
destroyers assigned this mission."

Air Support - Eniwetok

     Lieutenant Clifford Pruefer in his report of air support operations
noted:

The Marines made only two requests for air support (none accomplished),
although they did most of the fighting.  The Army troops obtained more than 20
air support missions, with good results . . . .  The Marines seemed to prefer
destroyer and artillery fire to the heavies dropped from the air . . . .

Logistics

     Associated with the establishment of assault forces, logistic problems
were many.  Some ingenious logistical solutions were produced, among which the
following at Engebi is noteworthy:

Demolition squads attempted to clear a channel for LST's to beach by blasting
coral heads during forenoon . . . .  The survey indicated it would be possible
to beach LST's at high water . . . .  LST-31 beached successfully, and at 1500
LST-484 grounded about 125 feet from beach line . . . .  At 1900 an LCT(6) was
moved between LST-484 and beach and unloading was begun using LCT(6) as a
causeway.

     Back-up logistic support for the advancing amphibious forces was also
moving forward in the Pacific.  The establishment of Service Squadron Four in
Funafuti in the Ellice Islands was followed by the establishment of Service
Squadron Ten in Majuro.  With this latter move our mobile logistical support
was 2,000 miles closer to Japan than at Pearl Harbor.

The Cost

     Eniwetok Atoll had been secured with the loss of 348 dead and 866
wounded.  The majority were Marines who fought on all three islands and on
every day of the period, 17-23 February.  Sixty-six prisoners were captured,
2,665 Japanese were reported buried by our forces but since some 3,400
Japanese were on the atoll, the rest must have been buried by the heavy air
and gun bombardments.

     An examination of the Japanese equipment and material at Eniwetok
indicated that this atoll would have been a lot more difficult and costly to
assault had the initial assault been long delayed.  Many new and unmounted
guns from 20-millimeter to 5- inch had recently been received at Eniwetok
Atoll as well as large amounts of concrete, steel reinforcing rods and
numerous land mines.  Eniwetok Atoll was in the process of becoming a tough
nut to crack and the assault against it was conducted none too soon.

     Another fortunate circumstance, as noted by Admiral Spruance was:

Whatever the cause, the delay on the part of the enemy in sending submarines
into the Gilberts and in reinforcing his striking air strength in the
Marshalls enabled us to capture our objectives with much less interference
from these arms than might have been anticipated.

     No Japanese airplane was seen at Eniwetok Atoll during the whole assault
phase.

Amphibious Round Up

     Rear Admiral Turner restated his convictions in regard to rehearsals in
his final report on the Marshall Island operations.  It is well worth
repeating:

Careful and detailed rehearsals of scheduled attacks against defended
positions are considered to be a most important feature of the preparation of
assault forces for amphibious operations . . . .  Elementary and basic
amphibious training provide only for the improvement in technique of the
individual, and of battalions or sometimes regiments.  On the other hand, the
assembly of a large amphibious attack force brings together numerous units of
different arms and services which may never have operated together, or have
had contact with each other.  Since a very high degree of coordination is
required for a successful assault, the activities of each of these elements
must be carefully dovetailed with those of the numerous other previously
unrelated elements.  Personal cooperation between strangers is involved.
Detailed supervision is required, if a smooth working team is to be produced,
and this supervision is exercised by a relatively small number of experienced
personnel.  Battle rehearsals provide the means for amalgamating the varied
elements of assault task forces into cohesive organizations, and of testing
and perfecting the numerous detailed plans that have been drawn up.  The final
rehearsal period in this, as in previous operations, was too short.

     Some of the lessons of Makin and Tarawa were modified by the experience
at Roi-Namur, Kwajalein and Eniwetok Atoll, but others were fully confirmed.
bong these were:

a.  The special effort made to organize, train and coordinate the beach and
    shore parties well in advance of the operation paid off.  As Rear Admiral
    Turner noted:  "The beach parties and Beach Masters functioned in
    excellent fashion."

b.  The technique for determining underwater hydrography and obstacles in the
    beach approaches was highly successful.  Close beach reconnaissance became
    a standard part of the pre-assault period.

c.  The need of a complete rehearsal and post-rehearsal critique and the
    advantages to be obtained therefrom were reaffirmed.  Stressed was the
    necessity of the aircraft from the Fast Carrier Task Forces to participate
    in both of these events.

d.  The LVT's and DUKWs conclusively proved their value for landing across
    reefs.  The DUKWs, a United States Army amphibious development, were
    introduced to Pacific Ocean amphibian warfare at Kwajalein.

e.  The LST's and LCT's proved their great usefulness and versatility,
    although during secondary phases of the assault landings as was noted by
    one subordinate commander: "LCT's have a tendency to hole up somewhere"
    and enjoy life.

f.  A good deal of palletized cargo had to be broken down before sending it
    into the beaches in LVT's and DUKWs.

g.  The dropping of parachute flares by the air coordinator's plane from about
    2,000 feet altitude, as a signal that the leading wave of amtracs was 500
    yards from the beach and all naval gunfire artillery and air support
    should be shifted inland, worked well at all landings except at Parry
    Island.

h.  Strafing by aircraft in support of the first waves of the assault landings
    was changed at Kwajalein Atoll from the parallel approach to runs
    perpendicular to the track of the landing waves.  This permitted the
    strafing to be conducted safely when the lead waves were only 300-500
    yards from the beach, and was more effective.

i.  Early waves of assault troops should be aboard LST's carrying amtracs
    prior to Dog Day in order to avoid delays incidental to the rendezvous of
    boats with the LVT's.

New lessons learned were:

a.  Artillery could be successfully landed from DUKWs.

b.  Continuous star shells considerably reduced the number and effectiveness
of Japanese night counterattacks.

c.  Logistic support bases in the forward areas, where LST's could reload and
carry major parts of the logistic load to the objective, were needed.

d.  The organization and training of island garrison forces must be undertaken
before embarking them for islands taken from the Japanese.

e.  The new gunboats - LCI(G)'s - and their close fire support of the beach
assault waves were an essential part of the landings.

     One of the minor favorable results of the Flintlock Operation was the
opportunity to examine a Japanese submarine found broken in two in Kwajalein
Atoll and some of its torpedoes.

     It does not seem possible, but at this late date, January 1944, the Fleet
tugs accompanying the Joint Expeditionary Force did not have voice radio
installed.

     The merchant ships handling garrison troops and cargoes had had many
problems in Galvanic, but a lesser number in Flintlock, due to the improvement
in communication equipment and the greater experience of the officers assigned
to the staffs of the Garrison Groups.  A further improvement would result
later in such task groups, by the change in the Transport Doctrine which would
put a naval detachment commander and a cargo officer on each auxiliary
transport (XAP) and auxiliary cargo ship (XAK).  Additionally, CINCPOA issued
comprehensive instructions covering (a) "Loading and Unloading Ships and
Cargoes," (b) "Pallets," and (c) "Identification and Storage of Supplies,"
which spread the experience gained in Galvanic to all the merchant ships that
participated in Flintlock and later operations.

Summary

     According to the draft narrative history of the Amphibious Forces Pacific
Fleet, 191 ships and landing craft took part in the initial Galvanic
Operations in November 1943, excluding the ships of the Submarine Force and
Service Force which supported the operation but were not under the command of
Rear Admiral Turner or Vice Admiral Spruance.  Thirty five of these 191 were
in Task Force 52 and 56 were in Task Force 53 which together as TF 54 were
under Rear Admiral Turner's command.  These 91 ships and landing craft carried
35,000 Joint Expeditionary Force troops.

     The assault phase of Flintlock was much larger.  In the Joint
Expeditionary Force there were 276 ships and landing craft carrying 53,400
assault troops and 31,000 troops in the Reserve and Garrison Forces.  The gun
bombardments of Kwajalein Atoll and Eniwetok Atoll expended 18,000 tons of
ammunition.

Recognition of Success:  Spruance and Turner

     While the Kwajalein operations were still going on, Admiral Nimitz sent a
despatch for Admiral King's eyes only, which said among other things:

In view of the marked capabilities and devotion to duty of Rear Admiral
Richmond Kelly Turner, his proficiency in amphibious operations as
demonstrated in the South Pacific, the Gilberts, and currently at Kwajalein, I
recommend his immediate promotion to the grade of Vice Admiral.

     Admiral King bounced a despatch back:

How about Spruance?

     Admiral Nimitz immediately replied with a loud

Yes.

     The Secretary of the Navy was in the Marshalls and his approval was
obtained.

     It took a bit of doing at the Washington level to make this
recommendation in regard to Rear Admiral Turner a reality.  A look at the
Congressional Record for February 1944 does not indicate when the nominations
from the Navy Department for the promotion of Vice Admiral Spruance and Rear
Admiral Turner reached the Senate.  Presumably they both reached there on the
same day.  Admiral Spruance's nomination to be an admiral for temporary
service was reported favorably by the Committee on Naval Affairs, headed by
Senator Walsh of Massachusetts, on 15 February and was confirmed by the Senate
on 16 February 1944.  The Senate met on Thursday, 17 February, but took a
recess over 18th, 19th, and 20th, and then met on the 21st only to recess over
George Washington's Birthday until Thursday, 24 February 1944, when it met for
only three minutes.

     On 20 February 1944, Admiral Nimitz queried Admiral King in regard to the
progress being made on Rear Admiral Turner's promotion, since Vice Admiral
Spruance's promotion had already been effected.

     On Friday, the 25th, Senator Walsh favorably reported the nomination of
Rear Admiral Turner to the Senate.  The Senate next met on the following
Tuesday, and again on Thursday, 2 March, but took no action on this
nomination.

     The following extract from the Congressional Record tells the story of
Friday, 3 March 1944, when the Senate met again.

     March 3

The legislature clerk read the nomination for Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner
to be Vice Admiral in the Navy, for temporary service.

Mr. Danaker.  Mr. President, as I understand it, it is the purpose of the
Senator from New Mexico shortly to move that the Senate take a recess until
Tuesday.  [March 7th]

Mr. Hatch.  That is true.

Mr. Danaker.  Mr. President, in view of the fact that several senators from
the committee on Naval Affairs are necessarily absent, I respectfully ask that
the Senator from New Mexico not press for action on this confirmation.  There
is no reflection whatsoever upon the individual nominee, I have not the
slightest doubt that he is entitled in every respect to the promotion which
has been suggested.

Mr. Hatch.  So far as I know, there is absolutely no objection to the
confirmation of this nomination.  However, in view of what the Senator from
Connecticut has said, inasmuch as he has stated that he has no desire to
object to the nomination in making his request, I am glad to accede to the
request of the Senator from Connecticut and ask that the nomination be passed
over.

Mr. Danaker.  I should like to have it noted that there is no objection on my
part to the nomination.

The Presiding Officer.  Without objection the nomination will be passed over.

     On the following Tuesday, 7 March 1944, when the Senate was next in
session, Senator Hill moved that the nomination of Rear Admiral Turner to Vice
Admiral be confirmed.  Senator White "hoped that the request of the Senator
will be concurred in."  And this concurrence was given.  The travail was over.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel notified Rear Admiral Turner that day.

     The written evidence unearthed by this researcher as to what went on
behind the scenes in delaying favorable action on this nomination is near nil.

     Admiral Conolly told this scribe that he was in Washington at this time
on leave, and was sent up to Capitol Hill in early March 1944 to talk to
Senator Brewster of Maine who was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee
about the promotion, and that Senator Brewster told him that a Congressman
from Massachusetts, who had had a son killed at the Battle of Savo Island, was
the major objector to the promotion.

     Substantiation for the presence of Rear Admiral Conolly in Washington at
this critical juncture is found in a personal letter of 2 March 1944 to Rear
Admiral Turner from Captain James H. Doyle, then on duty in COMINCH
Headquarters, which said in part:

Rear Admiral Conolly arrived yesterday.  He is scheduled to tell about Roi and
Namur this morning.

     When Admiral Nimitz was questioned on the delay he replied that he had
been told by, he thought, Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, Chief of Naval
Personnel, that the heavy Marine Corps losses at Tarawa had been raised as a
major objection, coupled with Rear Admiral Turner's involvement in the Savo
Island defeat.

     Admiral Turner mentioned the matter only indirectly to me, saying:

It wasn't until my nomination to vice admiral was delayed by back stairs talk
in the Senate, that I realized the importance of an officer having a favorable
public image as well as a high professional reputation.

     Richmond Kelly Turner's public image, if accurately reflected by Time
Magazine in early 1944, was at snake-belly level.  Its 7 February 1944 issue
named Turner as a mean son-of-a-bitch" and backed this description up with a
dozen paragraphs of depreciating biography.  When Spruance and Turner actually
were promoted one grade, Time said with scorn:

This recognition of the two men who ran the Marshall show was also a sop to
the admirals at sea.

     In complete contrast, Time had a glowing six column spread on Major
General Holland M. Smith, USMC, in its issue of 21 February 1944.

Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, Promoted

     In commenting on Rear Admiral Turner's promotion and that of Major
General Holland M. Smith to lieutenant general, whose nomination Was reported
to the Senate on 13 March 1944 and confirmed the next day, the author of
Soldiers of the Sea has this to say in a footnote:

What General Smith, who had been a major general in 1941 when Admiral Turner
was only a captain (and had enjoyed relative seniority of either one or two
grades over Turner during much of the period prior to 1944) might have added,
but did not, was that an unexplained feature of his and Turner's 1944
promotion to three stars was a Navy Department reversal of their relative
rank; Turner's new date of rank was 4 February 1944 while Smith's was 28
February.

     The facts of the matter are quite different.  The only time General Smith
had ever been two ranks senior to Admiral Turner since the two officers were
both commissioned were two days in October 1941.  Major General Smith won that
rank on 1 October 1941 and Captain Turner was promoted to rear admiral (lower
half) on 3 October 1941.

     General Smith was commissioned as a second lieutenant five years before
Admiral Turner was commissioned an ensign.  Despite this, in the 33 1/2 years
that both had been commissioned, Turner had been senior to Smith in two ranks
and for a period of nearly 15 years (7 December 1919 until 29 May 1934).

     Actually Major General Smith's commission as a temporary lieutenant
general (and when promoted he was the only lieutenant general in the Marine
Corps other than the Commandant of the Corps), dated from the day the
recommendation was approved at the highest levels in the Navy Department, just
as Rear Admiral Turner's commission as a temporary vice admiral dated from the
day, 4 February 1944, when his promotion was approved at the Navy Department's
highest level.  On the despatch received from Admiral Nimitz recommending
Major General Smith for promotion to lieutenant general, there is this
personal memo by Admiral King:

Hold until Feb 26th K

Memo to ComMarCorps to make up nomination of General to Lt. Gen. K.

     The promotion went forward from COMINCH's office on 26 February and
cleared the other echelons on 28 February, when it was so dated.

Evaluation of the Flintlock Effort

Admiral Spruance's biographer wrote:

. . . Spruance himself considered that, among the major operations, it
[Flintlock] gave the most gain for the least cost.  Its success justified
Spruance's insistence on assaulting the Gilberts first.  Not only was the
experience gained at Tarawa put to very profitable use, but the contribution
of our aircraft operating from the Gilbert's was of inestimable value.

The Meat of the Matter

     In forwarding the Flintlock Report of a subordinate, Rear Admiral Richard
L. Conolly put on paper the major fundamental of amphibious operations:

Cooperation and team work are the basis for successful amphibious operation.
These can and must be achieved, if necessary, by either of the two
participants, Naval or Landing Force, at times going more than half-way to
solve the Joint problems presented.  COMTRANSDIV 26, by placing blame entirely
on his embarked troop unit, reflects on his own responsibility to obtain the
requisite teamwork.

Kind Words

     After Eniwetok had been captured, the Secretary of the Navy sent a
congratulatory message to Rear Admiral Turner:

On behalf of the entire Navy I send sincere congratulations to you and All
Hands under your command on brilliant planning and outstanding accomplishments
of recent campaigns.  The country is proud of you all and confident of your
continued successful progress westward.

     But sunshine really broke out of the clouds when Major General Holland M.
Smith expressed his feelings in the following letter:

01/180                                  Forward Echelon
Ser. 0024-2                             Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps
                                        Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

SECRET                                  8 February 1944

From:     The Commanding General.
To:       The Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force.

Subject:  Letter of Appreciation.

1.  Upon the eve of his return to PEARL, the Commanding General, V Amphibious
Corps, wishes to express his deep appreciation to the Commander, Fifth
Amphibious Force, for the whole hearted and complete support given to the V
Amphibious Corps in its capture of the KWAJALEIN Atoll.  The successful
termination of this operation was made possible by the full support of all
units of the Force.

2.  May it suffice to say that this Corps takes pride in serving under the
Force, and with it behind us we would storm the very gates of Hell.

                                        /s/ H. M. SMITH

Original given to Admiral Turner